Professor Harry V. Jaffa Divides the House: A
Respectful Protest and a Defense Brief
Robert L. Stone*
There are in nature certain fountains of justice, whence all
civil laws are derived but as streams.'
Man's [natural] capacity for justice makes democracy possiinclination to injustice makes
ble, but man's [natural]
2
democracy necessary.
I.
A.

INTRODUCTION
The Context

Professor Harry V. Jaffa has done it again. His remarkable essay, "What Were the 'Original Intentions' of the Framers
of the Constitution of the United States?," together with his
related book, The Crisis of the House Divided,3 should help
"provoke the most profound and far-reaching debate of our
Both works are
generation about American politics."4
required reading for anyone who would know what is this
thing called law. Both address the central question in American Constitutional law today, which is the same question over
which the Civil War was fought: How should the law be inter* B.A., Stanford University, 1969; M.A., Columbia University, 1972; J.D., the
University of Chicago, 1982; Ph.D., the University of Chicago, 1986; Law Clerk, United
States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, 1982-83; member of the bar of
Illinois, admitted 1982.
1. F. BACON, OF THE PROFICIENCE AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, DIVINE AND
HUMAN, Book 11 (1605).
2. R. NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS: A
VINDICATION OF DEMOCRACY AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS TRADITIONAL DEFENSE xiii
3. H. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED (1959).

(1944).

4.
Harry V. Jaffa's CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED is: (1) a political history of the
United States through the years preceding the Civil War; (2) an analysis of
the political thought of the spokesmen (Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A.
Douglas) for two of the alternative courses proposed during those years; and
(3) a creative venture in political philosophy that-unless the United States be
as sick intellectually as some of us believe it to be-will provoke the most
profound and far-reaching debate of our generation about American politics.
W. KENDALL, THE CONSERVATIVE AFFIRMATION 249 (1963).
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preted if the Declaration of Independence is correct that it is
self-evidently true that all men are created equal?
Science is not egalitarian. In the study of the law there is
a natural' hierarchy of the importance of the questions asked
and answered. If the law is like a house, the Constitution of
1787 is like the foundation of the house in which we Americans
live; statutory law is like the supporting walls; and case law is
like the roof. To begin legal education, as do many law
schools, with case law is like building a house by starting with
the roof. Professor Jaffa demands that we proceed from the
ground up. In fact, he goes so far as to look to see what lies
under the foundation by exploring the nature of obligation:
"[E]very human being has the indefeasible right to ask anyone
proposing to exercise authority over him,"Why should I obey
[the Constitution or any other law]?"6 We are indebted to Professor Jaffa for a profound if passionate elaboration of the
enormous consequences to Constitutional law of the fact that
in American positive law the answer to the question of obligation is found in the same document as the doctrine of the
equality of all men and an invocation of natural right: In the
Declaration of Independence, the first "organic law" in the
current edition of the United States Code.7 Abraham Lincoln
5. "Nature: from natus, born; the essential character of a thing; qualities that
make something what it is; essence; in-born character; inherent tendencies of a
person." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE (1974) s.v.

"nature". For an explication of the meaning of "nature," see L. STRAUSS, NATURAL
RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953); J. Klein, On the Nature of Nature, in LECTURES AND
ESSAYS 219-239 (1985); H. Jaffa, "Is Political Freedom Grounded in Natural Law,"
Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy
(February 1984); H. JAFFA, THOMISM AND ARISTOTELIANISM (1952); G. ANASTAPLO,
HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN:

ESSAYS ON VIRTUE, FREEDOM, AND THE COMMON GOOD

(1975) Ch. IV: "Natural Right and the American Lawyer;" Ch. V, "Liberty and
Equality," which is a review of Professor Jaffa's EQUALITY AND LIBERTY: THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1965); and Ch. VI: "Law and Morality," which is a
review of Lord Devlin's THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965) and Jacob Klein's A
COMMENTARY ON PLATO'S MENO (1965); and G. Anastaplo, Introduction, A
Conversation with Harry V. Jaffa at Rosary College, in H. JAFFA, AMERICAN
CONSERVATISM AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (1984): the "minority belief that [is]
fundamental to sensible political science and to a decent life as a community is a
general respect for natural right and what is known as natural law. This means,
among other things, that discrimination based on arbitrary racial categories cannot be
defended, especially by a people dedicated to the self-evident truth that 'all men are
created equal.' It also means that the family as an institution should be supported."
6. Jaffa, What Were the 'OriginalIntentions' of the Framersof the Constitution
of the United StatesZ 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 351, 363, 367 (1987).
7. 1 U.S. CODE xxxv-xxxvii (1982 ed.). The other "organic laws" include the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the Constitution of 1787, with the Bill of Rights.
The relevant portion of the Declaration is the second paragraph:
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showed that some Supreme Court decisions such as Dred
Scott', which denies the doctrine of natural equality set forth
in the Declaration, are not the supreme law of the land. Furthermore, he argues that this is the case because the question
of obligation determines not only what the law should be, but
also what the law is in concrete practical cases.9
Why is it that virtually all Americans say that they honor
and obey the Constitution? Is it because the majority ratified
it, and we should honor and obey anything for which the
majority voted? If so, why? Is it because the majority outnumbers the minority? If so, is this just another way of saying,
"Might makes right?" A majority once voted for Hitler and his
political program. Do Nazi laws then have the same status as
our laws? On the other hand, do we obey and honor the Constitution not because the majority voted for it, but because it is
good-and the majority voted for it because it is good. Both
reasons are important, but which is more so? If the Constitution is good, it must be because it is good for human beings.
What, then, is a truly human being? If the nature of being
human, i.e. human nature, is shaped by history or the environment rather than being fixed, then human nature can be
adapted to any constitution, even a Nazi constitution or a cannibal constitution, and we must in principle be indifferent to
the kind of constitution we have.
However, if human nature cannot change, then the status
of the Constitution, and hence also of all subordinate laws,
depends upon whether or not the laws adapt themselves to the
requirements of human nature. If a law is adapted to the
requirements of human nature, it is naturally right or just. If
it is not adapted to the requirements of human nature, it is
naturally unjust. That is the doctrine of natural right. And if
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
amoung these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness-That to secure
these Rights, Governments are instituted amoung Men, deriving their just
Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People
to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its
Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to
them shall seem likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
1 U.S. CODE xxxv (1982 ed.).

8. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. [19 How.] 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1857).
9. CREATED EQUAL? THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, 3-7, 2829, 36-37, 77-79, 120, 217-18, 256, 309-11, 328-29, 337-38, 377-78 and 394 (P. Angle ed.
1958); H. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED (1959).
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this doctrine is true, then nature or being is the deepest question underlying the science of law-just as it is the deepest
question underlying all the other sciences.
Does this doctrine mean that students of the law may not
differ on the questions posed by their discipline? Not at all.
For an example of the flexibility and undogmatic character of
the doctrine of natural right, we should turn to the fullest
elaboration of the doctrine in the Anglo-American legal tradition: Not the Declaration, but rather Judge William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws,' ° the "oracle of the
common law." (The Constitution of 1787 does not explicitly
mention natural right. But Judge Blackstone's understanding
of the common law is incorporated implicitly into the Constitution of 1787 through Article III and the Seventh Amendment's
reference to the common law.)"
Judge Blackstone throughout his work compares the common law with the civil or Roman law, showing how these two
very different systems of law adapt themselves to the requirements of nature. For example, in the chapter on family law,' 2
Judge Blackstone assumes that, because human nature is invariable, all human societies must provide institutions for the
10. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS (1st ed. 1765-1769), 4 vols
[herinafter COMMENTARIES].
For a beginning of an interpretation of the
COMMENTARIES and for an explanation of why the first edition of 1765-1769 is more
authoritative than later American editions for some questions of American
Constitutional law, see R. Stone, Review of Blackstone's Commentaries, 8 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 923 (1981). A few examples of Judge Blackstone's influence on the
Framers of the Constitution of 1787 include the following. His advocacy of the
doctrine of "separation of powers" is persuasive. His writings on the importance of the
writ of habeas corpus and of a free press, and his disavowal of all prior restraints on
the press contributed to the establishment of these fundamental constitutional rights
on American shores. Similarly, the Framers assumed that the relevant public was
generally familiar with Blackstone's discussion of the nature of "the executive power"
when they drafted article II. In fact, W. W. Crosskey, in POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1953), 2 vols., points out that the enumeration of some of the powers of
Congress in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of 1787 is best understood as, in
part, an amendment of the list set forth in the COMMENTARIES, transferring certain
powers from the executive to the legislative branch of government. Moreover, Judge
Blackstone's elucidation of the principles of sovereign immunity gained wide currency
among the various colonies and became part of American law. Of course, Judge
Blackstone's doctrine of natural right helped inspire the American Revolution. R.
Stone, id. at 925.
11. For a compelling elaboration of this thesis, see W.W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1953 and 1980), 3 vols. Of course, as T.S. Schrock & R.C. Welsh
point out in Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117
(1978), none of this means that federal judges are free to make up or create laws.
12. 1 COMMENTARIES supra note 10 at 448-450 ch. 17.
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care of the young. Beasts do not care for the young of other
members even of their own species, because they cannot reason. Also, because human nature is invariable, all civilized
societies must provide for legally appointed guardians when
the parents are unable to care for their children. Human
nature being what it is, the common law does not permit an
infant's heir to be also his guardian. (For the same reason, it
may be against public policy for a parent to be the beneficiary
of a large insurance policy on the life of his child or otherwise
to have a direct interest in his child's death.) The common law
seeks to protect the life of the child. However, Roman or civil
law does permit an heir to be a guardian, because, human
nature being what it is, an heir will take much better care of
the infant's property than would a disinterested non-heir.
Both approaches, common law and civil law, assume natural self-interest, and both are coherent and sensible-but there
are a strictly limited number of such approaches. Thus nature
suggests the questions, although it does not dictate one set of
answers. Judge Blackstone does not claim that the common
law is the only natural law. But any legal arrangement that
does not adapt itself both to nurturing of the young and to selfinterest would not make sense or be respected. Hence, it
would be unnatural and could not endure. Judge Blackstone
states the general relationship between positive law and natural right as follows:
This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated
by God himself, is, of course, superior in obligation to any
other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at
all times; no human [positive] laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their
force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately,
from this original. 3
Therefore, "Aristotle himself has said, speaking of the laws of
his own country, that jurisprudence of the knowledge of those
'14
laws is the principal and most perfect branch of ethics.
However, as mentioned above, the Constitution of 1787 does
not mention explicitly natural right. Is it thereby rejected, or
is it thereby assumed? As important as this question is, many
lawyers today would be hard pressed to answer it. Professor
Jaffa provides a most cogent and eloquent reminder that the
13. 1 COMMENTARIES, supra note 10 at 41.
14. 1 COMMENTARIES, supra note 10 at 27.
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foremost American source of natural rights that is recognized
as law is the Declaration of Independence.
Professor Jaffa's argument is that the deepest and most
characteristic division in American politics is the debate
between Abraham Lincoln and John C. Calhoun 5 (Stephen A.
Douglas was standing in for Calhoun) 6 on the question of slavery or States' Rights. The earlier debate between Alexander
Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson did not represent opposite
poles, because they were not as clear in their thought and took
both sides of the fundamental question: Is the ground beneath
the foundation of our law ultimately morality or force-the
natural rights of man or majority rule? (A third possible position, associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement, is
that law is basically fraud,'7 but this doctrine is similar to Calhoun's.) In this debate, Lincoln and Calhoun stand in for Aristotle and Machiavelli, respectively. One of the deepest issues
at stake in this titanic conflict is the question of the status of
nature: Aristotle teaches that the world is naturally so
ordered that good men tend to prevail in the end. Machiavelli
teaches' S that force and fraud are justified because the world is
naturally so ordered that good men finish last.
Professor Jaffa argues incisively that Dred Scott' 9 is an
application of Calhoun's doctrine to the question of the legal
status of slavery in the territories. Calhoun held that the Constitution of 1787 established a government of concurrent
15. See J. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT (1853). See also R. Lerner,
Calhoun'sNew Science of Politics, 57 AMERICAN POL. Sci. REV. 918-932 (1963).
16. Douglas would take exception to any characterization of him as standing in for
Calhoun. His career, as Professor Jaffa points out in CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED,
was devoted to avoiding the Civil War by finding a middle course between Lincoln and
Calhoun. He did not agree with Calhoun that slavery is a positive good or that the
Constitutional rights of the South were violated by the Missouri Compromise. But
Lincoln is right when he saw that, on the question of the natural rights of man, there
are only two viable opinions.
17. For one example, see Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979): "[All] legal thinking ... has a double
motive. On the one hand, it is an effort to discover... social justice. On the other, it is
an attempt to deny the truth . . . about the actual . . . social world ....
In its second
aspect, it has been . . . an instrument of apology-an attempt to mystify . . . by
convincing [us] of the "naturalness," the "freedom" and the "rationality" of a condition
of bondage ... something like chaos." (at 210-211).
18. For an interpretation of the works of Machiavelli that touches the heart of his
disagreement with Aristotle, see I. Kristol, Machiavelli and the Profanation of
Politics, in REFLECTIONS OF A NEO-CONSERVATIVE (1983), discussed in this review irfra
at 499.
19. See supra note 8.
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majorities composed of the State governments and the federal
government, with the States enjoying the rights of veto (or
nullification) and secession. Furthermore, Calhoun held, the
rights of the Southern States were violated by the Missouri
Compromise,20 which excluded slavery from the territories
north of 36 degrees 30 minutes. Dred Scott held that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional because it deprived
slaveowners of their property without due process of law. The
Missouri Compromise had been replaced by the KansasNebraska Act of 1854,21 which was sponsored by Stephen
Douglas, and which provided for popular majority sovereignty
on the question of slavery in each territory. Lincoln argued
that a decision by the majority in a territory to legalize slavery
would not have the authority of true law because it violates the
natural-rights doctrine of the Declaration. Calhoun's argument at its core is that majority rules, and majority must be
the local majority in the area in question and not all men in
the world. "Majority rules," if it is the only legal principle, is
'22
another way of saying, "Might makes right.
Another aspect of Professor Jaffa's argument is more obviously relevant for lawyers today. He points out that the doctrine of "legal realism, '23 the doctrine that asserts "the law is
20. The Missouri Compromise, effective 1820 and repealed in 1854, comprised two
statutes. One provided that Maine would enter the Union as a free State. Act of April
7, 1820, 16th Cong. Sess. 1, ch. 19, 3 U. S. Statutes at Large 544. The other statute
provided that Missouri would enter as a slave State, with slavery prohibited elsewhere
in the Louisiana Purchase north of 36 degrees 30 minutes. Act of March 6, 1820, 16th
Cong. Sess. 1, ch. 22, 3 U.S. Statutes at Large 545. The Kansas-Nebraska Act, effective
May 30, 1854, repealed the Missouri Compromise. Southerners wanted no free
territory west of Missouri and so had prevented attempts to organize Kansas and
Nebraska as one territory. The Act was sponsored by Stephen A. Douglas and
provided for two separate territories, each of which would decide the slavery question
for itself according to the principle of "popular sovereignty." The practical result was
that both pro- and anti- slavery forces sent money and armed settlers into Kansas to
influence the vote by means of force. The results of this "squatter sovereignty" were
"bleeding Kansas" and the formation of the Republican Party, which sought to repeal
the Act.
21. Act of May 30, 1854, "An Act to Organize the Territories of Nebraska and
Kansas," 33d Cong. Sess. 1, ch. 59, 10 U S. Statutes at Large, 277.
22. Cf. A. Lincoln's Address, at Cooper Union, New York (February 27, 1860).
"Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the end, dare to
do our duty as we understand it." 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
550 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
23. The origin of legal realism is T. HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN (1651). Before
Hobbes, no thinker on the law had dared to take explicitly such an antimoral position.
In Plato's Republic, legal realism is argued by Thrasymachus, who asserts that justice
is the interest of the stronger. But Thrasymachus is shamed into silence by Socrates.
In American legal science, the most revered exponent of legal realism, or legal
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what the judges say it is,"'2 4 is yet another way of saying, with

Calhoun, that "might makes right." And the temporary ascendency of this doctrine in American law schools 25 represents "a
victory of Richmond over Washington." Furthermore, Professor Jaffa's most pointed argument is that conservative thinkers, while seeking to defend American law against attempts to
purge it of morality, have done this by invoking States' Rights
and majority rule. (Conservatives who would rely only on the
words of the text of the Constitution would do so because that,
not the ideology of activist judges, is what has been ratified by
the people. But the principle of majority rule cannot stand
alone.) On this fundamental question, Lincoln prevailed over
Douglas: There are only two viable positions. Of course, this is
not to say that majority rule is not a proper principle, in accord
as it is with both natural equality and positive law. Rather, it
is to say that the principle of majority rule cannot stand alone
because it has no moral content. It is mere procedure without
substance. In the words of Thomas Jefferson,
All too will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though
the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to
be rightful must be reasonable; that the minority possess
their equal rights, which 26
equal law must protect, and to violate would be oppression.
The problem that Professor Jaffa emphasizes may be
found in the work of Willmoore Kendall. In his review of
positivism, is Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. "What Marshall had raised, Holmes sought
to destroy. The natural constitution behind the written constitution, characteristic of

Marshall's jurisprudence and the object of the court's solicitude, was to give way to the
will of society and the competitive conditions for its appearance." FAULKNER, THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL.

"There is no meaning in the rights of man

except what the crowd will fight for." Letter, Holmes to Harold Laski (July 28, 1916),
1 HOLMES-LASKI LETrERS 8 (1953).
24. "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it
is." Charles Evans Hughes, Speech at Elmira, New York (May 3, 1907). "Just so far as
the aid of the public force is given a man, he has a legal right, and this right is the
same whether his claim is founded in righteousness or iniquity." 0. W. HOLMES, JR.,

THE COMMON LAW 169 (M.D. Howe ed. 1963).
25. The doctrine of legal realism is for the most part confined to the law schools.
The crucial defect in American Legal Realism is that it stops at the
courthouse door. It has no meaning for either an advocate or a judge. The
judge trying to decide a case will not be helped by the reflection that the law
is anything he says it is, nor will the lawyer serve his clients' cause by arguing
it in those terms.
R. RODES, THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE 20 (1976).
26. The inaugural address of Thomas Jefferson, quoted by Jaffa, supra note 6 at
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Jaffa's Crisis of the House Divided,2 7 Mr. Kendall writes that,
it was the Southerners [Calhoun] who were the anti-Caesars
of pre-Civil War days, and ... Lincoln was the Caesar Lincoln claimed to be trying to prevent; and... the Caesarism
we all need to fear is the contemporary Liberal movement,
dedicated like Lincoln to egalitarian reforms sanctioned by
movement
mandates emanating from national majorities-a
28
which is Lincoln's legitimate offspring.
And about the meaning of the Equality Clause in the Declaration, Kendall and Carey opine as follows:
Our best guess is that the clause simply asserts the proposition [not truth] that all peoples who identify themselves as
one-that is, those who identify themselves as a society,
nation, or state for action in history-are equal to others
who have likewise identified themselves ....
[E]quality is
not listed among those ends to be secured by government
....
That Lincoln held a markedly different conception of
the equality clause is beyond dispute .... That he considered
equality a value or goal to be promoted... seem clear from
the Gettysburg Address. If there be any doubts on this
score, the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lincoln's speech at
Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), and, among other items,
his Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861)
29
ought to dispel them.
There is some evidence that Mr. Kendall, late in life, was won
over to Lincoln's position, probably by Professor Jaffa himself,
and that he decided that Lincoln was not responsible for the
later mistakes (such as the "one person, one vote" rule) 0 that
were made in the name of the Declaration's Equality Clause.
But taking Mr. Kendall's published works as they stand, Mr.
Kendall stands convicted under Professor Jaffa's passionate
27. H. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED (1959).
28. W. KENDALL, THE CONSERVATIVE AFFIRMATION 252 (1963).
29. W. KENDALL AND G. CAREY, THE BASIC SYMBOLS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
TRADITION 155-156 (1970). For a refutation of Kendall and Carey, see H. Jaffa,
Equality as a Conservative Principle, in How TO THINK ABOUT THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION: A BICENTENNIAL CEREBRATION 13-48 (1978).
30. "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence...

can mean only one thing-one person, one vote." Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381
(1963), which struck down Georgia's county-unit system of voting for State-wide
offices. If the principle of this case were correct, the present system of electing United
States Senators, in which one vote in Wyoming counts the same as about sixty-five
votes in California, would be incompatible with the Declaration.
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indictment. Woe to the citizen upon whom this public prosecutor focuses his searingly critical eye.
B.

The Indictment Has Three Flaws

In this essay, Professor Jaffa sharply criticizes several
prominent thinkers on the law, including Robert H. Bork,
Jeane Kirkpatrick, Martin Diamond, and Irving Kristol, all of
whom have risked the prosecutor's wrath by agreeing with him
that the old and tried is preferable to the new and untried.3 '
Lewis E. Lehrman, in the first paragraph of his Foreword to
Professor Jaffa's essay, implies that this prosecutorial indictment lacks "the temperament of a lawyer" and "the profession
of a judge." This reviewer will show that Professor Jaffa's
method throughout his indictment has three flaws. First, he
takes statements of sensible political compromises-such as
support for judicial restraint, British traditions, and local selfgovernment-and treats them as if they were philosophical
statements. Second, he assembles a composite indictment,
which in law is appropriately applied only to an indictment
against a proven conspiracy, the existence of which Professor
Jaffa has not proved. (If the argument from Machiavelli for
slavery had four steps, and each of four authors says one or
two of the four steps, it does not follow that any one of the
four authors intends the whole argument.) Third, this
reviewer will show in detail that each of the statements of the
four steps almost certainly was not intended as such by its
author. Professor Jaffa's indictment therefore fails to meet its
burden of proof. A decent respect to the opinions of mankind
requires that I should declare the causes which impel me to
these observations. To prove them, let facts be submitted to
"our candid countrymen.' 3 2
II.

HE HAS REFUSED HIS ASSENT TO THE WORKS OF
HONORABLE ROBERT H. BORK, WHICH ARE

THE

WHOLESOME AND NECESSARY FOR THE

PUBLIC GOOD

Professor Jaffa alleges that Judge Bork teaches that there
is no general theory of constitutional law, and that this is good
31. "What is conservatism? Is it not adherence to the old and tried, against the
new and untried?" A. Lincoln's Address, at Cooper Union, New York (February 27,
1860), 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 537 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
32. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 379.
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because "our constitutional liberties arose out of historical
experience."3 3 He alleges that Judge Bork denies that our
colonial charters were based on the "immutable laws of
nature" and alleges that Judge Bork claims that public opinion
and the opinion of the Framers was not antislavery at the time
of the writing of the Constitution of 1787. 4 All of these allegations are supposed to be evidence that Judge Bork is, whether
he knows it or not, like all the other members of "the whole
tribe of Conservative publicists," a Calhounian apologist for
legal realism, slavery, and States' Rights.3 5
I have been unable, after a search of Judge Bork's published works, to find any claim that the opinion of the Framers
was not antislavery at the time of the founding or that our
colonial charters were not based on the immutable laws of
nature. This shifts the burden of proof back to the
prosecution.
It is true that the phrases quoted by Professor Jaffa, if
examined in isolation, do seem to support his allegation that
Judge Bork denies natural right. But when the phrases are
seen in context, a more evenhanded interpretation suggests
itself. Judge Bork's writings on Constitutional law are
intended as contributions to the current debate in American
law schools and courts on the question of whether federal
judges are bound by the text of the Constitution.3 " In "The
Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution,"3 7
Judge Bork argues that we the people in the several states are
legally free to increase or decrease charitable payments to the
33. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 373.
34. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 385, 394.
35. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 373, 380, 385, 391. We are dealing here with an entire
"legion of present-day Conservative epigones" of Calhoun. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 377.
36. Of course, to be bound by a text does not mean that one is not supposed to
consider the history of the text and the purpose of the text in context. "Original
intention" means original context, and that must include history secondarily. In the
words of Judge Bork,
I represent that school of thought which insists that the judiciary invalidate
the work of the political branches only in accordance with an inference whose
underlying premise is fairly discoverable in the Constitution itself. That
leaves room, of course, not only for textual analysis, but also for historical
discourse and interpretation according to the Constitution's structure and
function. The latter approach is the judicial method of McCulloch v.
Maryland, for example, and it has been well analyzed by my colleague
Professor Charles Black in his book, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [1969].
37. R. Bork, Commentary: The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the
Constitution," (1979) WASH. U. L.Q. 695.
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poor. He says that his opponents (certain ultra-liberal teachers
at Harvard of the doctrine of "representation-reinforcement") 3 argue that we as a community do not have this freedom-that we may increase but not decrease such payments,
because to decrease them would, under the First, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments, abridge the rights of the poor or
of Blacks to speak and to vote, and might make them feel
"stigmatized." The opponents' argument prevailed to a limited
extent in several Supreme Court decisions during the 1960's
and 1970's. 9
On this and similar questions, Judge Bork is vexed by the
tendency of his opponents not to rely on textual or legal arguments but, refusing to abide by the rules laid down, to resort to
an "abstract, philosophical style. 4 ° Justice Holmes made a
similar point in his dissent in Lochner v. New York,4 ' which
held that the people of New York as a community do not have
the freedom under the Constitution to prohibit the employment of bakery employees for more than ten hours a day or
sixty hours a week. Holmes states what for us is obvious:
"The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics."'
Does a hostility to saying that the
Fourteenth Amendment enacts the Harvard doctrine of representation-reinforcement mean that Judge Bork is hostile to
philosophy? Or are such reservations justified because "[t]he
consequence of this (so-called) philosophical approach to constitutional law almost certainly would be the destruction of the
38. Id. at 700.
39. G. STONE, SEIDMAN, SUNSTEIN, AND TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1986),
assert that the doctrine of representation-reinforcement is, to use a phrase those
authors would eschew, the "final cause" of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. R. Bork, supra note 38 at 701.
41. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42. Holmes's opinion bears further quotations:
It is settled... that ...state laws may regulate life in many ways which we as
legislators might think as injudicious .. .and which ... interfere with the
liberty to contract .... Sunday laws and usury laws are ancient examples. A
more modern one is the prohibition on lotteries. The liberty of the citizen to
do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do
the same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is
interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal
institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable, whether he
likes it or not. The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics.
198 U.S. at 75. The force of Justice Holmes's dissent is not diminished by recognition
that he, unlike Judge Bork, was a "legal realist."
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idea of the law.143 Judge Bork properly refrains from obiter

dicta-from deciding questions that are not ripe for adjudication. Should a good judge say, "The Harvard doctrine of representation-reinforcement is wrong because, for the following
reasons, it is incompatible with the original intention of the
Framers," which is what Judge Bork indicates in other words?
Or should he, as Professor Jaffa urges him to do, say that "The
Harvard doctrine is wrong because it is incompatible with original intent, and, by the way, I know of another doctrine that is
compatible?" For example, from the point of view of the discipline of the Law, one of the many objectionable aspects of
Dred Scott is that Chief Justice Taney reaches out in a dictum
to discuss the Declaration of Independence at all-when the
case should have been decided on the narrower ground of the
Territory Clause of Article IV, Section 3, parag. 2. If a reluctance to follow Taney's example is part of what it means to be
a judge, then it is not fair to assume that a judge's silence
about the Declaration means either agreement or disagreement. To the extent that the Framers of the Constitution of
1787 were successful and we are bound by their work, the philosophical questions have been settled and do not come before a
judge." This is an indication that the system is working well,
not badly. As Judge Bork explains,
What is important about the non-interpretivists is not that
they added moral philosophy but that moral philosophy displaces such traditional sources as text and history and renders them unimportant.4 5

Professor Jaffa refers us to Judge Bork's "Tradition and
Morality in Constitutional Law"' as evidence that he teaches
that the academic study of Constitutional law has very little
theory of its own. Therefore, judges are compelled to turn for
guidance, when the text is ambiguous, to "the common sense of
43. R. Bork, supra note 37 at 696.
44. "Indeed, in one important respect the American Revolution was so successful
as to be almost self-defeating: It turned the attention of thinking men away from
politics, which now seemed utterly unproblematic, so that political theory lost its vigor,
and even the political thought of the Founding Fathers was not seriously studied." I.
Kristol, The American Revolution as a Successful Revolution, AMERICA'S CONTINUING
REVOLUTION 9 (1975).
45. R. Bork, Styles in ConstitutionalTheory, 26 S.TEx. L.J. 383, 394 (1955).
46. R. Bork, Tradition and Morality in ConstitutionalLaw, in VIEWS FROM THE
BENCH: THE JUDICIARY AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 166 (M. Cannon and D.
O'Brien Eds.) (1985) (cited by Jaffa, supra note 6 at 373).
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the community, '47 i.e., to "American traditions" or history,
which Judge Bork indicates are distinct from "morality."
However, according to Professor Jaffa, American "traditions"
in 1787 most conspicuously included slavery.48 Are these facts
evidence that Judge Bork would defend slavery? For example,
to apply Judge Bork's method of reliance upon historical context, the same way any lawyer interprets any statute, we seek
the answer to the question, "Does the Republican Form of
Government Clause forbid slavery in the States?" If I may
presume, for the sake of the argument, to speak for Judge
Bork, the answer would be, "No, because the Southerners who
wrote the Constitution of 1787 believed that their States were
republican forms of government in 1787, and in 1787 they had
slaves." But this is not the end of the answer. "Therefore,
emancipation should have been accomplished by an act of Congress under the Commerce Clause or by amendment. ' 49 What
is wrong with this argument? Does the fact that Calhoun
would have used at least part of it mean that it is wrong? Does
the fact that Calhoun would have used part of it mean that
Judge Bork is a Calhounian?
Again, the context of Judge Bork's remarks are decisive
for understanding them. True, Judge Bork, in "Tradition and
Morality in Constitutional Law,"5 0 says that the academic
study of Constitutional law has very little theory of its own.
But he makes it clear that he deplores this lack of theory and
the resultant appeals to mere "tradition" or history. He
defends them only as preferable to appeals to "contractarian
[libertarian] or utilitarian or what-have-you philosophy rather
than.., to the Constitution"-because such "philosophies" are
outside of "our most basic compact."5 1
[C]onstitutional law has very little theory of its own and
hence is almost pathologically lacking in immune defenses
47. I& at 167.
48. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 376.
49. There is no evidence whatsoever that Judge Bork would include slavery in the
traditions of Anglo-American law or in the common sense of the community. Judge
Bork knows the common law, and Blackstone makes it clear that slavery is wholly
incompatible with the common law, that it can exist only by statute, and that judges
should restrict it whenever and however possible. The common sense of the
community is the common law for most purposes. 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
supra note 10, at 412-413 (1st ed. 1765-1769). For another argument that slavery is unAmerican, see infra note 102 of this brief.

50. See supra note 46.
51. Id. at 169.
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against the intellectual fevers of the larger society as well as
against the disorders that were generated by its own internal
52
organs.
It is stubborn refusal of Anglo-American law before the twentieth century to impose upon the people a "philosophy" that
does not have the consent of the people in their basic social
compact that distinguished the American from the French
revolution. And to the extent that judges impose any such
external philosophy, no matter how good it be, we are no
longer "a free people. ' 53 To read this profound critique of
American Constitutional law as taught in most law schools
today as a hostility to philosophy in general and an antipathy
to natural rights in particular is to go beyond the text.
One of the important truths that Professor Jaffa is asserting is that the legal realists are wrong when they argue that
law is basically force or fraud (which are two of the three possible answers to the question,"Why do We Obey the Law?").
Rather, the ground of all positive law is morality. And on this
decisive question Judge Bork and Professor Jaffa are in complete agreement. Thus, Judge Bork can endorse the observation that,
Whatever else law may be, it is . . .stubbornly entangled
with beliefs about right and wrong. Law that is ... legitimate is related to the larger universe of moral discourse ....
If law is not.., a moral enterprise, it is without legitimacy
or binding force [i.e., it is not truly a law]. 54
No logically consistent legal realist or Calhounian could indicate that an immoral law is not fully a law. What Judge Bork
is doing is showing us why there is a critical need in the science of law for a moral ground 55 and then why that ground
must be found in the texts-and why Constitutional law will
52. Id. at 167.
53. Id. at 170.
54. Id at 171 (quoting R. NEUHAUS).
55. With regard to moral ground, Professor Jaffa implies that one's position on
what used to be called the Negro Question is the litmus test of American politics.
Judge Bork, in CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUSING PROPOSALS (1972),
argues-against some reputable students of the law-that Congress is granted, by
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, significant power to regulate the use of
busing as a remedy in desegregation decrees. On the other hand, Judge Bork also
argues that Congress does not have the authority to except all busing cases from the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, a tactic that Congress was at one time considering
to stop busing. Nominations of Joseph T. Sneed to Be Deputy Attorney General and
Robert H. Bork to Be Solicitor General: Hearings before the Committee on the
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remain "diseased" and "fevered" until such a ground is recognized. It will remain diseased for lack of theory because,
"mere tradition carrie[s] no authority." Judge Bork:
I recall one evening listening to a rather traditional theologian bemoan the intellectual fads that were sweeping his
field ....

I remarked with some surprise that his church

seemed to have remarkably little doctrine capable of
resisting these trends. He was offended and said there had
always been tradition. Both of our fields purport to rest
upon sacred texts, and it seemed odd that in both the main
bulwark against heresy should be only tradition. Law is certainly like that .... As Alexander Bickel observed, all we
ever had was a tradition, and in the last 30 years that has
been shattered.
Now we need theory, theory that relates the framers'
values to today's world. That is not an impossible task by
any means, but it is... complex .... 57
Now we need theory, theory that relates the Framers' prudence to today's world. That is precisely what Professor Jaffa
offers. He and Judge Bork are natural allies.
III.

HE HAS REFUSED HIS ASSENT TO THE WORKS OF JEANE
KIRKPATRICK, WHICH ARE WHOLESOME AND

NECESSARY FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD

Professor
Kirkpatrick:

Jaffa

quotes

from

the

works

of

Mrs.

The freedom of the American people is based not on the
marvelous and inspiring slogans of Thomas Paine but, in
fact, on the careful web of restraints, of permission, of interests, of tradition woven by the Founding Fathers into the
Constitution and explained in The FederalistPapers. And
rooted, of course, in our concrete rights as Englishmen. 5
Then he denies that she believes that one should "look for the
principles of the Constitution [in] the Declaration of IndepenJudiciary, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. 22-23 (1973) (exchange between Mr. Bork and Senator
Hart). Senator Hart responds, "I wish the full committee were here to hear that."
56. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 379.
57. See supra note 46 at 171.
58. JAFFA, supra note 6 at 375, (quoting from an article in the National Review.)
The same passage appears in book form in a collection of essays. See The Reagan
Phenomenon and the Liberal Tradition, THE REAGAN PHENOMENON AND OTHER
SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY 3-45 (1983).
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dence."5' 9 He alleges that she denies the natural rights of
man. ° He alleges also that she denies that public opinion at
the time of the founding was anti-slavery. 6 1 Further, as with
his allegations against Judge Bork, Professor Jaffa argues that
these alleged opinions are evidence that the defendant, knowingly or unknowingly, is a Calhounian defender of legal realism and States' Rights, and thereby slavery. 2
As in his
indictment of Judge Bork, Professor Jaffa provides us with
very few quotations, and some of the allegations are unsupported by references to any text, so I will have to refer to
works in addition to those cited by the prosecution.
The selection quoted above by Professor Jaffa is from
Mrs. Kirkpatrick's speech, "The Reagan Phenomenon and the
Liberal Tradition. '63 Taken alone it could reasonably be interpreted the way Professor Jaffa uses it. But taken in context, a
different and more favorable interpretation suggests itself.
This passage is used by Professor Jaffa in support of his allegation that Thomas Paine is a surrogate for Thomas Jefferson in
the works of Mrs. Kirkpatrick and that she rejects the Declaration' in favor of the "rights of Englishmen." But this passage, when published later in final, book form, appears within
two pages of the following explanation of what these rights
are:
The government of the United States was founded squarely
and explicitly on the belief that the most basic function of
government is to protect the rights of its citizens. Our
Declaration of Independence states, "We hold these truths to
be self-evident: that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights,
that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." It adds, "To protect these rights, governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed."
These notions-that the individual has rights which are
prior to government, that protection of these rights is the
59. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 377.
60. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 380, 382, 385.
61. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 391.
62. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 385.
63. Supra note 58 at 44.
64. "The truth, however, is that it is Jefferson who is being depreciated in the
slighting of Paine. But he [Jefferson] is too large a figure to be attacked directly. And
it is not the Rights of Man, but the Declaration of Independence, which by indirection
is the object of their patronizing condescension." Jaffa, supra note 6 at 375-76.
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purpose of the very existence of government, that the just
powers of government depend on the consent of the governed--are the core of the American creed. That being the
case, we naturally believe that the United Nations has no
more important charge than the protection or expansion of
65
the rights of persons.
So the Declaration is the core itself of what America means,
and Mrs. Kirkpatrick uses it to interpret not only American
law but international law as well. How could Professor Jaffa
ask for more? Lest someone allege that she does not understand the implications of natural rights for the attitude of the
law to relations among Blacks and Whites, another speech in
the same volume, which addresses itself to relations between
America and sub-Saharan Africa, leaves no doubt on this question. Mrs. Kirkpatrick rejoices in the advantage in world
affairs that America has because of the federal government's
uncompromising stance against both public and private "discrimination." America's position as the only large successful
multi-racial society in the West with a democratic government
gives us a tremendous moral advantage in dealing with African
and Asian countries. It is clear that Mrs. Kirkpatrick is proud
of our achievements in civil rights and wishes the efforts of the
federal government to continue.
How do we reconcile these two apparently contradictory
texts? One says that Americanism is the traditional rights of
Englishmen, and the other says that Americanism is the rights
of man. The simplest way is to suppose that the two are
understood to be one. The rights of Englishmen are the rights
of Englishmen as understood by the American founding generation; and Jefferson claimed that the Declaration was nothing
new but rather represented the common sense on the subject.
Mrs. Kirkpatrick is simply correct to identify the rights of
Englishmen with the natural rights of man. Judge Blackstone
writes that the common law on this question follows "the law
of nature and reason":
The three origins of the right of slavery assigned by Justinian, are all of them built upon false foundations. As, first,
slavery is held to arise 'jure gentium," from a state of cap65. Statement before the Third Committee of the United Nations General
Assembly (November 24, 1981), reprinted in Human Rights and Wrongs in the United
Nations, in THE REAGAN PHENOMENON AND OTHER SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY 46
(1983).
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tivity in war .... But it is an untrue position ... that, by the
law of nature or nations, a man may kill his enemy: he has
only a right to kill ... for self defense .... secondly, it is
said that slavery may begin "jurecivili," when one man sells
himself to another ....
But, every sale implies a price, a
quid pro quo... : but what equivalent can be given for life,
and liberty... ? Lastly, we are told, that. . . slaves ... may
also be hereditary. . . , jure naturae ....
But this being
built on the two former rights must fall together with
66
them.

Blackstone, having demolished on natural-rights grounds the
arguments for slavery, goes on to state the absolute rule, and
cites the famous Somerset case by Lord Mansfield. 7 In the
words of Judge Blackstone,
Upon these principles the law of England abhors, and will
not endure the existence of, slavery within this nation: so
that when an attempt was made to introduce it, by statute 1
Edw. VI. c.3. which ordained, that all idle vagabonds should
be made slaves, and fed upon bread, water, or small drink,
and refuse meat; should wear a ring of iron round their
necks .. . [etc.]; the spirit of the nation could not brook this
condition, even in the most abandoned rogues; and therefore
this statute was repealed in two years afterwards. And now
it is laid down, that a slave or negro, the instant he lands in
England, becomes a freeman; that is, the law will protect
him in the enjoyment of his person, his liberty, and his property. . . . Hence too it follows, that the infamous and
unchristian practice of withholding baptism from negro servants, lest they should thereby gain their liberty, is totally
without foundation, as well as without excuse. The law of
England acts upon general and extensive principles: it gives
liberty .... 68 [emphasis added]
In other words, slavery is contrary to the "extensive principles" of natural right, and is incompatible with the spirit of the
common law. This means that it can exist only by positive law.
If any legislature does legalize it, that statute should be interpreted as narrowly as possible by judges and will soon be
repealed. What happened in the colonies was, therefore, an
aberration. Professor Jaffa exaggerates the differences
66. 1 COMMENTARIES supra note 10 at 411-412.

67. Somerset v. Stewart, 20 How. St. Tr. 1, Eastern Term, 12 Geo. 3, K. B. (May 14,
1772).
68. 1 COMMENTARIES supra note 10 at 412-413.
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between England and New England, and Virginia, when he
dives through the surface to deal only with theory. In theory
the Parliament can do anything that is not naturally impossible. But what the British mean by that is that, of course, it
will not do anything contrary to natural right. If it tries to do
so, the offending statutes will be repealed.
Another difficulty remains with the practice of diving
through the surface of the law to deal only with natural law.
Even assuming arguendo that Mrs. Kirkpatrick and Judge
Blackstone are wrong about the "general and extensive" character of the rights of Englishmen, and somehow both secretly
reject natural-rights teachings, it still does not follow that they
must agree with Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott. There
almost always is a narrower ground on which a judge should
decide such questions. For example, the Fifth Amendment,
when it says that no person shall be deprived of his property
(in slaves or in something else) without due process of law,
necessarily implies thereby that any person may be deprived of
his property with due process. Therefore, there is nothing in
the Constitution of 1787 to prevent Congress from abolishing
slavery in all of the territories pursuant to Article IV, Section
3, parag. 2.69 We need refer to first principles only when the
text is ambiguous. On the question of the broad authority of
Congress to regulate property and liberty, there is little ambiguity.7 0 Likewise, hardly ambiguous is Mrs. Kirkpatrick's
understanding that the Declaration of Independence is the
"core" of not only American law but of the entire "American
creed." It is like Blackstone's "spirit of the nation," which is so
powerful that it can repeal acts of Parliament within two years
time. If this is the case, the difference between Mrs. Kirkpatrick and Professor Jaffa dissolves down to a disagreement over
69. U. S. CONST. Art. 4 section 3, cl. 2 U.S. Code xxxvii (1982): "The Congress
shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States .. "
70. For a most instructive commentary on the text and context of the Constitution

of 1787, see G. Anastaplo, The United States Constitution of 1787: a Commentary, 18
LoY. U. OF CHi. L.J. 15 (1986). Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which
nullifies a New York statute fixing maximum hours of work for bakers. The Supreme
Court, defending liberty from what it conceived as a mere meddlesome interference,
asked, "[A]re we all ... at the mercy of legislative majorities?" 198 U.S. at 59. The
correct answer, especially when the majority is in the United States Congress and not
the Assembly of New York, is "Yes." R. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 11 (1971).
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the status of Thomas Paine. And that question is not worth
discussing here.
IV. HE HAS REFUSED HIS ASSENT TO THE WORKS OF MARTIN
DIAMOND, WHICH ARE WHOLESOME AND NECESSARY
FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD

Professor Jaffa notices that the late Martin Diamond has
written that the Declaration provides "no guidance whatsoever" for the construction of the Constitution of 1787-that the
Declaration is "neutral" on this question. 7' This statement is
alleged to be evidence that Mr. Diamond, like Judge Bork and
Mrs. Kirkpatrick, and like all the other members of the
"whole tribe, '7 2 is a Calhounian apologist for legal realism and
States' Rights and therefore, slavery.
The passage in question bears consideration at some
length:
What wants understanding is precisely how [not whether]
our institutions of government sprang from the principle of
the Declaration ....
And what more had to be added actu73
ally to frame those institutions?

Mr. Diamond found in Lincoln's 1861 "Speech in Independence
Hall"74 evidence for a tentative answer to the question of precisely how our institutions of government sprang from the
Declaration:
All the political sentiments I entertain have been drawn, so
far as I have been able to draw them, from the sentiments
which originated, and were given to the world from this hall
in which we stand. I have never had a feeling politically that
did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Independence.75
It is interesting to note that the sentiment that Lincoln drew
from the Declaration was not equality but liberty:
I have often inquired of myself, what great principle or idea
it was that kept this Confederacy so long together. It was
not the mere matter of the separation of the colonies from
71. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 373, 386.
72. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 380, 377.
73. M. DIAMOND, The Revolution of Sober Expectations, in AMERICA'S CONTINUING
REVOLUTION, 27 (1975).
74. 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 240-241 (R. Basler, Ed. 1953).
75. Id. at 240 (quoted with emphasis added by Mr. Diamond, supra note 74 at 27).'
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the mother land; but something in the Declaration giving liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but hope to the
world for all future time .... This is the sentiment embodied in that Declaration of Independence. 7 6
What is the meaning of this interpretation of the Declaration?
Mr. Diamond:
We must take careful heed of Lincoln's remarkable stress,
throughout this speech from which we are quoting, on the
words feeling and sentiment. He carefully limits his indebtedness to the Declaration only to certain sentiments and
feelings, that is, to the spirit of liberty within which he conceives American government and its institutions. Indeed, he
could not have done otherwise..."
Mr. Diamond reminds us that, according to the Declaration,
equality is not said to be an inalienable right. Rather it is a
truth which precedes the rights and may be the logical precondition for the three inalienable rights listed: life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness:
. . . for there is nothing in the Declaration which goes
[N]oble document that
beyond that sentiment of liberty ....
the Declaration is, indispensable source of the feelings and
sentiments of Americans and of the spirit of liberty in which
their institutions were conceived, the Declaration 7 is8 devoid
of guidance as to what those institutions should be.
Mr. Diamond then quotes from a letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson which assumes that the works of John
Locke, from which Jefferson drew the Declaration, are likewise insufficient guides to interpret the Constitution. 79
There is no doubt that Mr. Diamond in the above passage
has made himself vulnerable to Professor Jaffa's allegations.
Professor Jaffa has an instinct for the jugular. But should not
the advocate distinguish between the holding of a case and
mere obiter dictum, by examining not the rhetorical flourish
("devoid of guidance") but the facts of the concrete case at
hand? The concrete questions that Mr. Diamond is addressing
are the following: If the American people, by means of the
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
M. DIAMOND, supra note 74 at 27.
Id. at 27-28.
Letter, James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, February 8, 1825, 9 THE WRITINGS

OF JAMES MADISON 218-219 (G. Hunt ed. 1900), discussed in M. DIAMOND, supra note 74
at 28-30.
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procedures set forth in the Constitution of 1787, were to amend
the Constitution to provide for an hereditary executive office
and a House of Lords, would that be unconstitutional because
of the Declaration of Independence? ° And, did the Declaration make property qualifications for the franchise unconstitutional?"' Mr. Diamond's answer to both questions is, "No." I
believe that Mr. Diamond is right.
Is it not true that the Declaration attacks tyranny-not
monarchy? If it is only "a Prince whose Character is thus
marked by every act which may define a tyrant" who is "unfit
to be the Ruler of a free People," the implication is that a
Prince whose character is not so marked would be fit to rule a
free people. Why would not a Whig monarchy, like England
today, in which the form of government is very democratic, in
which the hereditary executive is merely another public servant serving at the pleasure of parliament, be consistent with
the Declaration? Professor Jaffa says that the
American Whigs were willing to pretend that the monarchical ... features of the British constitution were compatible

with their natural rights, as a concession that any people
might prudently make "while evils are sufferable," rather
than "abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed."
But when evils were no longer sufferable and revolution
became necessary, prudence no longer dictated restraint to
Americans in making their institutions wholly republican. 2
However, the Declaration says that it is the right of the people
to institute their government, laying its foundations on such
principles, and organizing its powers not in republican form
but in whatever form, as to them shall seem most likely to
effect their safety and happiness. Again and again during the
Federal Convention, when the Framers were speaking in private and when the pre-Revolutionary fear of persecution was
long past, several leading Framers warmly described the British government as "the best in the world."8 3 In accordance
with Judge Bork's method of inference from historical context,
can we not agree with Mr. Diamond that it is unlikely that the
founding generation would have signed and subscribed to a
80.
81.
82.
83.

M. Diamond, supra note 74 at 31-36.
1& at 37-38.
Jaffa, supra note 6 at 387.
See, e.g., (A. Hamilton) J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 134 (Ohio University Press ed. 1966).
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Declaration of Independence that is incompatible with the best
government in the world? If so, slavery may be an untypical
case-one of the few institutions that cannot be reconciled
with the Declaration. If the Declaration is open even to constitutional monarchy, would it not then be open to almost any
other institution that is likely to come before the courts-provided that the institution in question has the consent of the
people?
With regard to the question of property qualifications on
the franchise, the purpose of Mr. Diamond's argument is to
show that such qualifications by the States could be compatible
with the Constitution and the Declaration-if they are reasonable and mild and have the consent of the people. Mr. Diamond recognizes, of course, that such qualifications are
abhorrent to American law today. However, he asserts that
the present situation is caused more by the Constitution of
1787 than by the Declaration of Independence. The Constitution of 1787 is the more democratic of the two documents
because it is the one that specifies our democratic institutions.8 4 This thesis is intended as a salutary refutation of those
who argue that the Constitution of 1787 is conservative while
the Declaration is liberal, hence the Constitution represents
the Revolution betrayed:
These are the two great charters of our national existence,
representing the beginning of our founding and its consummation; in them are incarnated the two principles-liberty
and democracy-upon the basis of which our political order
was established, and upon the understanding of which in
each generation our political life in some important way
depends. 85
This then is the "holding" of Mr. Diamond's essay. The dictum
is "devoid of guidance," but the holding is that, just as Professor Jaffa would say, our entire "political life," which must
include all of our laws, "depends" on the Declaration. The
"democratic" "sentiment" of the Declaration works on the law
establishes the then broadest possible democratic
84. "Article I, Section 2 ...
To this may be added the total
franchise as the basis of the federal election ....
absence of any property qualifications, contrary to existing state practices, for any
federal office, and also the clause barring the introduction of any titles of nobility.
Finally, we may note the provision for payment of salaries to federal officeholders
M. .DIAMOND, supra note 74 at 38.
85. M. DIAMOND, The Declarationand the Constitution: Liberty, Democracy, and
the Founders, in THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 39, 45-46 (1976).
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to prohibit property qualifications on the franchise, and it does
this by working through a Constitution that does not specifically forbid such qualifications.
What then is the difference between the teachings of Professor Jaffa and of Mr. Diamond? It seems that they agree
that the Declaration is the core of the American creed, that it
means what it says that all men are created equal, that the positive laws somehow "depend" upon it, that Lincoln interpreted
the Declaration correctly, and that Lincoln's political project of
emancipation was correct because it was naturally right. They
disagree only as to how the Declaration acts upon the positive
law.
On two crucial occasions the Supreme Court has directly
invoked the Declaration to invalidate positive law. In Dred
Scott it held that Negroes are not "men." 6 In Gray v. Sanders
(1963) it held that "The conception of political equality from
the Declaration of Independence

. .

.

can mean only one

thing-one person, one vote.""7 There can be no doubt that the
method specified in the Constitution for electing United States
Senators does not square with the "one person, one vote"
approach. It is not obvious why, if the Declaration can serve as
the basis for striking down the State statute in Gray v. Sanders, it cannot also operate to nullify the provision in Article I,
Section 3, that the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each State, regardless of the
number of voters in each State. Since it is obvious that this
result was not intended by the Framers of the Constitution, is
it not correct to say that the result in Gray v. Sanders cannot
rest upon the Declaration directly but requires an act of Congress to enforce the Declaration (under the Republican Form
of Government Clause," as Justice Frankfurter suggested in
Baker v. Carr) 8g-just as emancipation of the slaves required
either a Constitutional amendment or a statute? The obvious
fact that slavery is incompatible with the Declaration does not
mean that slavery was illegal prior to 1865. It merely means
that Congress was authorized to outlaw it when it saw fit. Mr.
86. 15 L.Ed. at 703 "[I]t is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race
were not intended to be included [in] this Declaration."
87. 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
88. U. S. CONST., art. IV, § 4: "The United States shall guarantee to every state in
this union a Republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against
invasion ......
89. 369 U.S. 186, 301 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan, J.).
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Diamond seems correct in arguing that the Declaration works
only indirectly upon American law.
But what of Professor Jaffa's remaining allegation, that
Mr. Diamond is a legal realist? In all his writings, Mr. Diamond, like Professor Jaffa, keeps before his readers the "philosophical question of what human nature is."9 ° But we should
let the defendant speak for himself:
The modern idea of human nature is democratic. No difference among us can reach so far as to alter our naturally
equal humanness, and that is the crucial fact .... Now a

democracy derived, so to speak, from the natural equality in
depravity (or at least mediocrity) of all mankind is obviously
a democracy in need of moderation ....And the means for
achieving this moderation, obviously, would have to be
drawn from that same human nature, the universal fallibility of which had justified democracy in the first place. The
scheme . . .is nowhere stated more thoughtfully, nor more
chillingly, than by James Madison in Federalist51 ...using

one person's passion or interest to check another's [and] to
emancipate acquisitiveness to a degree never contemplated
by traditional political thought. 9 '
In summary, Mr. Diamond's account of the significance of
the Declaration of Independence shows the "chilling" necessity
of the relationship between the Declaration and the Constitution and is thoroughly compatible (with the possibly minor
exception of whether the Declaration operates directly or indirectly upon the positive law) with the account provided us by
Professor Jaffa. One would expect such a compatibility,
because these men are intellectual brothers who openly
acknowledge their indebtedness to their intellectual father,
Leo Strauss.9 2
V.

HE HAS REFUSED HIS ASSENT TO THE WORKS OF IRVING

KRISTOL, WHICH ARE WHOLESOME AND NECESSARY
FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD

Professor Jaffa quotes from the works of Irving Kristol:
90. This is the opening phrase of Mr. Diamond's essay, The American Idea of Man:
The View from the Founding, THE AMERICANS: AN INQUIRY INTO FUNDAMENTAL
CONCEPTS OF MAN UNDERLYING VARIOUS U. S. INSTITUTIONS

(I. Kristol and P. Weaver

eds. 1976).
91. Id. at 7-14.
92. L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953), remains the definitive study

of the modern natural-right doctrine of Hobbes and Locke.

1987]

Jaffa Divides The House

To perceive the true purposes of the American Revolution it
is wise to ignore some of the more grandiloquent declamations of the moment ....
In the heat of debate, people do say all kinds of things. According to Mr. Kristol, one should ignore especially the excesses of
Thomas Paine:
Tom Paine, an English radical who never really understood
America, is especially worth ignoring ... [L]ook [instead] at
the kinds of political activity the Revolution unleashed. This
activity took the form of constitution-making, above all. In
the months and years immediately following the Declaration
of Independence, all of our states drew up constitutions.
These constitutions are terribly interesting in three respects.
First, they involved relatively few basic changes in existing
political institutions and almost no change at all in legal,
social, or economic institutions; they were, for the most part,
merely revisions of the preexisting charters. Second, most of
the changes that were instituted had the evident aim of
weakening the power of government, especially of the executive; it was these changes-and especially the strict separation of powers-that dismayed [the French revolutionaries],
who understood revolution as an expression of the people's
will-to-power rather than as an attempt to circumscribe
political authority. Thirdly, in no case did any of these state
constitutions tamper with the traditional system of local selfgovernment. Indeed, they could not, since it was this traditional system of local self-government which created and
legitimized the constitutional conventions themselves.94
Reservations about. Tom Paine have been discussed in Section
III above with regard to Mrs. Kirkpatrick. 9 The nub of this
question is whether the texts that Professor Jaffa quotes support his allegation that criticisms of Tom Paine are intended as
veiled attacks on the Declaration of Independence-which
Mrs. Kirkpatrick and Mr. Kristol allegedly do not dare to
attack openly. Likewise, the advantages of the method of reliance on historical context to discern the original intent of a
law-notwithstanding Chief Justice Taney's misuse of the
method in Dred Scott-are discussed above in Section II on
93. I. Kristol, The American Revolution as a Successful Revolution, in AMERICA'S
CONTINUING REVOLUTION 1, 13 (1975).
94. I. KRISTOL, supra note 94 at 13-14, quoted at Jaffa, supra note 6 at 373, 375-376,

380, 386.
95. See infra at 485-488.
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Judge Bork. Mr. Kristol's contribution to the debate is the
thesis of the continuity of the colonial institutions and charters
with the Declaration. Is his point that the Declaration is
thereby rendered less democratic, or that the preceding institutions are seen as more democratic?
In short, the Revolution reshaped our political institutions in
such a way as to make them more responsive to popular
opinion and less capable of encroaching upon the personal
liberties of the citizen-liberties which long antedated the
new constitutions and which in no way could be regarded as
the creation or consequence of revolution. Which is to say
that the purpose of this Revolution was to bring our political
institutions into a more perfect correspondence with an
actual "American
way of life" which no one even dreamed of
96
challenging.

What is the essence of that "American way of life which no
one even dreamed of challenging"? Does Mr. Kristol say that
it included slavery, or does he say that it included "local selfgovernment"? Does defense of "local self-government" represent a covert defense of slavery?
Professor Jaffa's second allegation against Mr. Kristol is
that the above passage indicates that he rejects the naturalright teaching of the Declaration in favor of the traditions of
the American people:
What these pristine documents of the Revolution assert is in
direct contradiction of Calhoun, as it is of Kristol, Bork,
Kirkpatrick, and the whole tribe of present-day Conservative publicists . ..

in reading the Declaration of Indepen-

dence-and its reasoned teaching of equal and universal
natural and
human rights-out of the American political
97
tradition.

The third allegation against Mr. Kristol is that the thesis
of the continuity of the colonial and Revolutionary institutions
reveals this defendant as a Calhounian defender of legal realism and States' Rights and thereby slavery.
To believe what Kristol believes about this unquestioned
American way of life, one would have to read the documents
of the period-including the Constitution-the same way
96. I. KRISTOL, supra note 94 at 14.
97. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 380.
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98
Chief Justice Taney did in Dred Scott.

The second and third allegations both rest upon the first. The
decisive question, then, with regard to the allegations against
Mr. Kristol, is whether defense of "the American way of life,"
seen essentially as a deep commitment to "local self-government," necessarily implies rejection of universal rights and a
defense of slavery.
Mr. Kristol's thesis that the Americans were a self-governing, free people from the beginning, and that as such they
were fundamentally different from the Europeans who
remained in Europe, is not a new thesis. Alexis de Tocqueville9 9 made the same point:
America, as Marx observed in the same spirit as Tocqueville,
did not have a "feudal alp" pressing down upon the brow of
the living. During one hundred and seventy years of colonial
life the stuff of American life was 00
thus quietly being prepared in the direction of democracy.
The context of Mr. Kristol's remarks is an attempt to distinguish the American from the French revolution. It is obvious
that the one succeeded and the other failed to perpetuate itself
in law. 10 1 What accounts for this difference? Are not de Tocqueville and Kristol correct to point to the centuries-old tradition of self-government in America? The success of the
American Revolution, then, is because it is a much easier task
to remove a monarchical lid on underlying democracy than it is
to impose democracy upon a people that have never had it? It
is impossible here to decide this historical question.
But even a cursory reading of "A Coppie of the Liberties
of the Massachusets Colonie in New England," reproduced for
the convenience of the readers as an Appendix, indicates that
the burden of proof remains upon Professor Jaffa to show that
de Tocqueville and Kristol are wrong. If we look to the
famous Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, the continuity with both
98. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 376.
99. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (G. Lawrence trans. 1969).
100. M. Diamond, The Revolution of Sober Expectations, AMERICA'S CONTINUING

REVOLUTION 23, 36 (1975) 36.
101. The laws of the American Revolution are still in force more than two
centuries after the Declaration. And they are in force not merely on paper but in the
hearts and minds of Americans. The laws of the French revolution, which had been
purchased at the enormous cost of the Terror, endured only fifteen years until
Bonaparte restored the absolute executive. And France became a democratic republic

only about eighty years after the French Revolution.
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the Declaration and the Bill of Rights of 1791 is obvious. But
the Massachusetts Body of Liberties is the most difficult case
from Mr. Kristol's point of view. This document was the earliest New England code of laws and was adopted in 1641, fortyseven years before the Glorious Revolution and one hundred
and thirty-five years before the Declaration of Independence.
It was adopted by the General Court of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay after having been considered by the freemen of
the several towns and then revised and voted by the General
Court. There are numerous parallels to the Magna Carta and
the English common law. If the thesis that the colonial charters and the Declaration are in essence alike, and that all are
intended primarily to protect local self-government and civil
liberties, is correct, then Professor Jaffa surely does not want
to argue that this thesis is Calhounian. Does he mean to argue
that defense of local self-government necessarily implies
defense of "squatter sovereignty" and hence defense of slavery
and/or segregation?
There is evidence in Professor Jaffa's text that he would
concede the above argument. He does admit that Mr. Kristol's
thesis "may be regarded as true-if somewhat hyperbolic"but only if "the American way of life" is understood to mean
10 2
not what Americans did in practice (which included slavery)
but what they said in the Declaration and the colonial charters.1 0 3 But this is exactly what Mr. Kristol indicates in the
passage quoted above by Professor Jaffa. This is precisely why
Mr. Kristol refers us to the colonial charters and to the Revolutionary constitutions in the thirteen States.
102. It is by no means settled that the American way of life... in 1776 and 1787"
included slavery. JAFFA, supra note 6 at 376. Cf. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 364, (where he
describes slavery as an anomaly.) Few New Englanders or Pennsylvania Quakers
would have agreed with him. Americans at the Feast of Thanksgiving, their most
characteristic holy day, stubbornly persist in revering as their ancestors the Pilgrims of
what soon became Massachusetts, not the dashing, wealthy cavaliers that settled

Jamestown in Virginia-in spite of the embarrassing facts that Jamestown was settled
earlier, that the first thanksgiving was celebrated at Jamestown, and that Governor
Bradford's famous diary is silent about the supposed first thanksgiving at Plymouth.
A plausible explanation

for this apparent anomaly

is that Americans have for

centuries seen themselves as the belonging to Massachusetts and not to Virginia.
Massachusetts was the leader in the Revolution and the leader in agitation for
emancipation. It is no accident that Thanksgiving was instituted as a national holiday

by Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War. The Virginian way of life, including
slavery and the oligarchic traditions it made possible, was correctly perceived as being
un-American-for the reasons Professor Jaffa and Mr. Kristol point out. R. STONE,
Civic EDUCATION, HOLIDAYS, AND THE UNITED STATES' REGIME 358-380 (1986).

103. Jaffa, supra note 6 at 389.
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If Professor Jaffa then admits that Mr. Kristol's thesis
"may be regarded as true-if somewhat hyperbolic," then one
should wonder what all the passion is about. Perhaps there is
evidence that Mr. Kristol is influenced by the teachings of
Machiavelli, whose works like those of his student, Thomas
Hobbes, are "justly decried"? In his Appendix A, Professor
Jaffa tells us that one's position on the works of Machiavelli is
a litmus test of whether one believes in the natural-right doctrine of the Declaration. 10 4 It is much to Mr. Kristol's credit
that he has published an excellent essay, "Machiavelli and the
Profanation of Politics,"' 10

5

on just this question.

Here Mr.

Kristol rejects the legal-realist argument that Machiavelli simply tells it as it is, or in the words of Francis Bacon,
We are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write
what men do, and not what they ought to do.'0 6
Mr. Kristol touches the heart of the difference between the
followers of Aristotle on the one hand and the followers of
Machiavelli and Hobbes on the other hand, with regard to politics and the law. Aristotle, Mr. Kristol tells us, teaches that
the world is naturally ordered in such a way that truly good
men tend to prevail in the long run."' Machiavelli teaches:
If you watch the ways of men, you will see that those who
obtain great wealth and power do so either by force or fraud,
and having got them they conceal under some honest name
the foulness of their deeds. Whilst those who through lack
of wisdom, or from simplicity, do not employ these methods
are always stifled in slavery or poverty. Faithful slaves
always remain slaves, and good men are always poor men.
Men will never escape from slavery unless they are unfaithful and bold, nor from poverty unless they are rapacious and
fraudulent, because both God and Nature have placed the
fortunes of men in such a position that they are reached
rather by robbery than industry, and by evil rather than by
honest skill 0 8s
104. Jaffa, supra note 6 at Appendix A, p.398.
105. I. KRISTOL, Machiavelli and the Profanation of Politics, REFLECTIONS OF A
NEOCONSERVATIVE 123 (1983).
106. 2 F. BACON, OF THE PROFICIENCE AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, DIVINE
AND HuMAN, (1605).
107. I. KRISTOL, supra note 106 at 123-125, citing Aquinas: "Eventus sequens no
facit actun malum qui erat bonus, nec bonum qui erat malus."
108. N.

MACHIAVEILLI, HISTORY OF FORENCE AND OF THE AFFAIRS OF ITALY FROM

THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE DEATH OF LORENZO THE MAGNIFICENT (1532), (quoted in I.
KRISTOL, supra note 106 at 129).
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Mr. Kristol then classes Machiavelli not with the scientific
teachers of politics as it really is but with Nietzsche and de
Sade, the teachers of immorality.' °9 Mr. Kristol leaves no
doubt which teacher he believes is the better, more effective,
guide for rulers (or for lawyers). And there can be no doubt
which teacher presents the traditional doctrine of natural law.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons state above, this reviewer respectfully submits that Professor Jaffa has failed to meet his burden of
proof. We have appealed to Professor Jaffa's native justice and
magnanimity. We conjure him by the ties of his common kindred with his intellectual brethren to disavow the terms of this
debate, which would inevitably interrupt our connections and
correspondence. It remains to be seen what his response will
be to the voice of justice and of consanguinity.

109. I.

KRISTOL, supra note

106 at 134.
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APPENDIX

A COPPIE OF THE LIBERTIES OF THE MASSACHUSETS
COLONIE IN NEW ENGLAND*

The free fruition of such liberties Immunities and
priveledges as humanitie, Civilitie, and Christianitie call for as
due to every man in his place and proportion [every man is created equal]; without impeachment and Infringement hath ever
bene and ever will be the tranquillitie and Stabilitie of
Churches and Commonwealths. And the deniall or deprivall
thereof, the disturbance if not the ruine of both [and what distinquished tyrannical from free government].
We hould it therefore our dutie and safetie whilst we are
about the further establishing of this Government to collect
and expresse all such freedomes as for present we foresee may
concerne us, and our posteritie after us, And to ratify them
with our sollemne consent ["consent of the governed"].
We do therefore this day religiously and unanimously
decree and confime these following Rites, liberties, and
priviledges concerning our Churches, and Civill State to be
respectivly impartiallie and inviolably enjoyed and observed
throughout our Jurisdiction for ever.
1. [Due-process clause] No mans life shall be taken away,
no mans honour or good name shall be stayned, no mans person shall be arested, restrayned, banished, dismembred, nor
any wayes punished, no man shall be deprived of his wife or
children, no mans good or estaite shall be taken away from
him, nor any way indammaged under Coulor of law, or Countenance of Authoritie, unlesse it be by vertue or equitie of
some expresse law of the Country waranting the same, established by a generall Court and sufficiently published, or in case
of the defect of a law in any particular case by the word of god
2. [Equal-protection clause] Every person within this
Jurisdiction, whether Inhabitant or forreiner shall enjoy the
same justice and law, that is generall for the plantation, which
*

Source: "The Body of Liberties," Old South Leaflets No. 164 (Directors of the

Old South Work, Old South Meeting House, n.d.). The Massachusetts Body of
Liberties was adopted in 1641 by the General Court of the Colony of Massachusetts
Bay. It had been revised by the General Court from a draft by Nathaniel Ward (who
had studied the English common law), was next considered by the freemen of the
several towns, again revised and voted by the General Court. Comments in brackets
are added by this reviewer.
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we constitute and execute one towards another, without partialitie or delay.
18. [Fifth and Eighth Amendments] No person shall be
restrained or imprisoned by by Authority what so ever, before
the law hath sentenced him thereto, If he can put in sufficient
securitie, bayle, or mainprise, for his appearance, and good
behaviour in the meane time, unlesse it be in Crimes Capitall,
and Contempts in open Court, and in such cases where some
expresse act of Court doth allow it.
29. [Seventh Amendment] In all Actions at law it shall be
the libertie of the plaintife and defendant by mutual consent to
choose whether they will be tryed by the Bench or by a Jurie,
unlesse it be where the law upon just reason hath otherwise
determined. The like libertie shall be granted to all persons in
Criminall cases.
42. [Fifth Amendment] No man shall be twise sentenced
by Civill Justice for one and the same Crime, offence, or
Trespasse.
48. [Freedom of Information Act] Every Inhabitant of the
Counrtie shall have free libertie to search and veewe any
Rooles, Records, or Regesters of any Court or office except the
Councell, And to have a transcript or exemplification thereof
written examined, and signed by the hand of the officer of the
office paying the appointed fees therefore.
LIBERTIES OF FORREINERS AND STRANGERS

89. If any people of other Nations professing the true
Christian Religion shall flee to us from the Tiranny or oppression of their persecutors, or from famyne, warres, or the like
necessary and compulsarie cause, They shall be entertayned
and succoured amongst us, according to that power and prudence god shall give us.
91. [Thirteenth Amendment] There shall never be any
bond slaverie villinage or Captivitie amongst us, unles it by
lawful Captives taken in just warres, and such strangers as
willingly selle temselves or are sold to us. And these shall
have all the liberties and Christian usages which the law of god
established in Israell concerning such persons doeth morally
require. This exempts none from servitude who shall be
Judged thereto by Authoritie.
95.2 [First Amendment] Every Church hath full libertie
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to exercise all the ordinances of god, according to the rules of
Scripture ....
95.6 Every Church of Christ hath freedome to celebrate
days of fasting and prayer, and of thanksgiveing according to
the word of god.
96. [Privileges and Immunities Clause] How so ever these
above specified rites, freedomes, Immunities, Authorities and
priveledges, both Civill and Ecclesiasticall are expressed onely
under the name and title of Liberties, and not in the exact
forme of Laws, or Statutes, yet we do with one consent fullie
Authorise, and earnestly intreate all that are and shall be in
Authoritie to consider them as laws, and not to faile to inflict
condigne and proportionable punishments upon every man
impartiallie, that shall infringe or violate any of them.

